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 Vox Populi:  
Robert McCulloch, Ferguson & the Roles of 
Prosecutors and Grand Juries in             
High-Profile Cases 
Frank O. Bowman, III* 
ABSTRACT 
The decisions of St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney Robert 
McCulloch during the grand jury investigation of the shooting of Mi-
chael Brown by Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, have 
been criticized on a variety of grounds.  In an article written for a 
Missouri Law Review symposium on the shooting and its aftermath, 
titled “‘No, You Stand Up’: Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Be-
hind Grand Juries,” Professor Ben Trachtenberg takes Mr. McCulloch 
to task for allowing the grand jury to deliberate without making a rec-
ommendation about whether charges should be filed.  Professor 
Trachtenberg asserts that, at the close of the evidentiary presentation 
to the grand jury, Mr. McCulloch did not believe there to be probable 
cause and that, accordingly, McCulloch should either not have al-
lowed the grand jury to deliberate at all or should at the least have 
recommended against indictment due to lack of probable cause.  Pro-
fessor Trachtenberg strongly intimates that Mr. McCulloch behaved 
unethically, and he asserts forthrightly that McCulloch acted out of 
political self-interest and failed to properly fulfill the functions of his 
office. 
Whatever the merits of other criticisms of Mr. McCulloch, Profes-
sor Trachtenberg’s particular criticisms are unfounded.  This Article 
makes the case that, so far as appears from the public record, Mr. 
McCulloch conducted the Brown-Wilson investigation in compliance 
with Missouri law, violated no ethical rule, and, at least in his office’s 
relations with the grand jury, proceeded professionally and in a man-
ner calculated to promote the public interest. 
   
 
* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri 
School of Law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an article earlier in this Issue, my good friend and valued colleague 
Ben Trachtenberg argues that St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney Robert 
P. McCulloch acted improperly during the grand jury investigation of the 
shooting of Michael Brown by Officer Darren Wilson.1  Professor Trachten-
berg criticizes Mr. McCulloch’s decision to ask the grand jury to make a 
probable cause determination on whether Officer Wilson committed a crimi-
nal homicide without providing advice to the grand jury on whether the pros-
ecutor’s office believed probable cause to exist.  In Professor Trachtenberg’s 
colorful phrasing, Mr. McCulloch was “hiding behind the anonymous lay 
persons on the grand jury,” and “abdicated the usual role of the prosecutor, 
choosing instead to delegate his responsibilities to untrained citizens with 
inadequate guidance.”2  In the body of the article, Professor Trachtenberg 
strongly intimates that Mr. McCulloch’s approach violated standards of pro-
fessional ethics.3 
Reluctant though I am to take public issue with Professor Trachtenberg, 
who combines a penetrating intellect with sparkling wit, I cannot in good 
conscience leave his case against Mr. McCulloch unanswered.  Silence would 
be unfair to Mr. McCulloch and, more importantly, risks perpetuating a num-
ber of pernicious misconceptions about grand juries and the relationship of 
prosecutors to them.  Put plainly, so far as appears from the public record, 
Mr. McCulloch conducted the Brown-Wilson grand jury investigation in 
compliance with Missouri law, violated no ethical rule, and, at least with re-
spect to his office’s relations with the grand jury, proceeded in an entirely 
professional and sensible manner. 
In what follows, I express no view about the heterogeneous array of dis-
contents – many entirely justified – that exploded into national prominence 
after the Brown shooting and that are consequently, if confusingly, lumped 
under the heading of “Ferguson.”  Likewise, I express no view about Mr. 
McCulloch’s personality (which is undoubtedly brusque), his public remarks 
about the governor4 (which were, at the least, impolite), the conduct of his 
office in other cases, his standing with the electorate of St. Louis County, or 
his media strategy during the Brown-Wilson investigation, including ques-
tions about the timing of the announcement of the grand jury decision.  Nor 
do I indulge in speculation about Mr. McCulloch’s racial opinions, the effect 
of the circumstances of his police officer father’s death in the line of duty, or 
other personal matters about which, having never met the man, I cannot pos-
sibly know.  Professor Trachtenberg criticizes Mr. McCulloch for particular 
aspects of his conduct of the Brown-Wilson grand jury investigation.  I think 
 
 1. Ben Trachtenberg, No, You “Stand Up”: Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hid-
ing Behind Grand Juries, 80 MO. L. REV. 1099 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 1100. 
 3. Id. at 1105–07. 
 4. Id. at 1099, 1109. 
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that criticism unfounded.  This Article addresses that point, and that point 
only. 
II.  GRAND JURIES AND PROSECUTORS IN MISSOURI 
In the United States, felony criminal prosecutions are instituted in one of 
two ways: by indictment, which is a formal charge approved by a grand jury 
upon its finding that the offense stated in the indictment is supported by prob-
able cause, or by information (sometimes called a complaint), which is a for-
mal charge prepared by a prosecutor and filed directly with the court with no 
prior review by a citizen body.  In federal court, the U.S. Constitution re-
quires that all felony prosecutions begin with a “presentment or indictment of 
a grand jury.”5  This provision of the Fifth Amendment is not binding on the 
states.6  Therefore, although all states have some provision for grand juries,7 
less than half use them regularly, and none requires a grand jury indictment in 
all felony cases.8  The most usual arrangement – and the one employed by 
Missouri – is that grand juries may be empanelled, but prosecutors can elect 
either to introduce evidence to a grand jury and seek its imprimatur on an 
indictment or they can file charges directly with the court in an information.9 
Missouri law governing grand jury practice is limited.  Article I, Section 
16 of the Missouri Constitution states: 
That a grand jury shall consist of twelve citizens, any nine of whom 
concurring may find an indictment or a true bill: Provided, that no 
grand jury shall be convened except upon an order of a judge of a 
court having the power to try and determine felonies; but when so as-
sembled such grand jury shall have power to investigate and return in-
dictments for all character and grades of crime; and that the power of 
grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public 
officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith, shall never 
be suspended.10 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 6. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884) (“And the words ‘due pro-
cess of law’ in the amendment do not mean and have not the effect to limit the powers 
of state governments to prosecutions for crime by indictment . . . .”). 
 7. For a listing of the statutory provisions relating to grand juries in all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia, see Univ. of Dayton Sch. of Law, Size of Grand 
Jury, FED. GRAND JURY, http://campus.udayton.edu/~grandjur/stategj/sizegj.htm (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
 8. Univ. of Dayton Sch. of Law, Grand Jury Functions, FED. GRAND JURY, 
http://campus.udayton.edu/~grandjur/stategj/funcsgj.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
 9. State v. McGee, 757 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“There can be 
no doubt that under § 545.010, RSMo 1986, prosecution of a felony may be by infor-
mation or indictment and a prosecutor is entitled to exercise his discretion as to which 
course of action he selects.”). 
 10. MO. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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Missouri statutes do little more than reiterate the provisions of the con-
stitution.  They contain only two significant rules regarding the authority of 
grand juries: (1) grand juries “may make inquiry into and return indictments 
for all grades of crimes and shall make inquiry into all possible violations of 
the criminal laws as the court may direct”;11 and (2) an indictment may not be 
returned by a grand jury unless nine of its twelve members concur.12 
Curiously, neither the Missouri Constitution nor its statutes specify the 
standard of proof grand juries should apply in returning an indictment.  It is 
commonly said, and grand juries are routinely instructed, that they are to de-
termine whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed 
the offense charged in an indictment.13  But a grand jury’s decision to return 
an indictment is not reviewable for insufficiency of the evidence,14 so, in 
practice, grand jurors can apply whatever standard seems good to them with-
out fear of reversal. 
Note that Missouri remains firmly in the long Anglo-American tradition 
of employing grand juries both as a screening mechanism in cases in which 
the government proposes charges and as an investigative body.15  Both Mis-
souri’s constitution and statutes make clear that a grand jury’s powers to in-
vestigate are not derivative of any prosecutorial authority.  By statute, a Mis-
souri prosecutor has only three functions in relation to grand juries: (1) he 
may “examin[e] witnesses in their presence”;16 (2) he may “appear before the 
grand jury . . .  for the purpose of giving information relative to any matter 
cognizable by” the grand jury;17 and (3) if “required by any grand jury,” he 
must “attend them for the purpose of . . . giving them advice upon any legal 
matter.”18 
The Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure add a fourth prosecutorial 
duty.  Rule 23.01(a) requires that indictments “shall be in writing, signed by 
the prosecuting attorney, and filed in the court having jurisdiction of the of-
 
 11. MO. REV. STAT. § 540.031 (Cum. Supp. 2013); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 
540.240 (2000) (stating that grand juries are “authorized to find and present bills of 
indictment for either felonies or misdemeanors committed against the laws of the 
state”). 
 12. MO. REV. STAT. § 540.250, .260 (2000). 
 13. State v. Mattic, 84 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 14. State v. Ivey, 442 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. 1969); State v. Selle, 367 S.W.2d 
522, 526 (Mo. 1963). 
 15. Gregory W. Vleisides & Catherine A. Donnelly, Indictments, Informations, 
and Grand Jury Proceedings, in CRIMINAL PRACTICE 1, 3 (4th ed. 2005).  Indeed, 
both the state constitution and Section 540.031 of the state code strongly suggest that, 
once a grand jury is empaneled, its investigative authority exists independent even of 
the judiciary, at least in cases involving misconduct by public officials.  See MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 16; MO. REV. STAT. § 540.031. 
 16. MO. REV. STAT. § 540.130 (2000); see also id. § 540.140. 
 17. Id. § 540.140. 
 18. Id. § 540.130. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/13
2015] VOX POPULI 1115 
fense.”19  Without the prosecutor’s signature, a Missouri indictment is legally 
invalid.20  This requirement may seem ministerial, but it is a critical grant of 
prosecutorial control over charging decisions.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit observed about the corresponding requirement of the 
federal rules: 
The provision of Rule 7, requiring the signing of the indictment by the 
attorney for the Government, is a recognition of the power of Gov-
ernment counsel to permit or not to permit the bringing of an indict-
ment.  If the attorney refuses to sign, as he has the discretionary power 
of doing, we conclude that there is no valid indictment.  It is not to be 
supposed that the signature of counsel is merely an attestation of the 
act of the grand jury.  The signature of the foreman performs that 
function.  It is not to be supposed that the signature of counsel is a cer-
tificate that the indictment is in proper form to charge an offense.  The 
sufficiency of the indictment may be tested before the court.  Rather, 
we think, the requirement of the signature is for the purpose of evi-
dencing the joinder of the attorney for the United States with the grand 
jury in instituting a criminal proceeding in the court.  Without the sig-
nature there can be no criminal proceeding brought upon an indict-
ment.21 
In sum, in both federal and Missouri courts, no prosecution can be initi-
ated by the grand jury acting alone.  Unless and until an indictment approved 
by the grand jury is signed by the prosecutor, there is no “charge” against 
the defendant, no “prosecution” has been initiated, and the defendant has no 
case to answer.  This point is critical to understanding how Professor 
Trachtenberg has misread the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
are binding on Mr. McCulloch, as well as the ABA’s Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution Function, which are merely precatory and bind no one.22 
 
 19. MO. R. CRIM. P. 23.01(a) (emphasis added). 
 20. See, e.g., State v. Horn, 79 S.W.2d 1044, 1045 (Mo. 1935) (quoting State v. 
Bruce, 77 Mo. 193, 195 (Mo. 1882)) (“We are satisfied that no paper can be regarded 
as an indictment without the signature of the prosecuting attorney, and the certificate 
of the foreman of the grand jury that it is a true bill.  Both are required, and neither is 
a mere formality that may be dispensed with.”).  See also State v. Elgin, 391 S.W.2d 
341, 343–44 (Mo. 1965) (acknowledging rule that a prosecutor must sign indictments, 
but upholding validity of indictment signed by an assistant prosecutor).  The Missouri 
rule is analogous to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1), which requires that 
an indictment “be signed by an attorney for the government.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 
7(c)(1). 
 21. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 22. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has no independent authority to 
create legally binding ethical rules.  However, its model rules are sometimes adopted 
in whole or in part by state supreme courts or state bar ethics regulators, thus render-
ing them binding on lawyers in the adopting state.  See Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Preface, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
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III.  ETHICAL RULES AND ADVISORY STANDARDS ON GRAND JURY 
PRACTICE 
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-3.8(a), which is identical to ABA Mod-
el Rule 3.8(a), states that a “prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”23  Professor Trachtenberg strongly implies that Mr. McCulloch vio-
lated this standard.24  However, it is absolutely plain that McCulloch did not. 
A violation of Missouri Rule 4-3.8(a) can only occur if a prosecutor: (1) 
“prosecut[es] a charge” and (2) does so when he “knows [the charge] is not 
supported by probable cause.”25  But there can be no “charge” in a grand jury 
matter until an indictment is approved by the grand jury and signed by the 
prosecutor.  Thus, Mr. McCulloch did not “prosecute a charge” against Of-
ficer Wilson.  He therefore could not have violated Missouri Rule 4-3.8(a), 
regardless of what he may have thought about the strength of the evidence 
against Wilson. 
Professor Trachtenberg also cites Standard 3.9(a) of the ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function, which states: 
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit 
the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor 
knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.  A prose-
cutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the contin-
ued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissi-
ble evidence to support a conviction.26 
Once again, by definition, Mr. McCulloch did not “institute, or cause to 
be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges.”27  In a 
 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct_preface.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).  In the case of the 
ABA’s prosecution standards, Missouri has not adopted them.  Moreover, as to the 
charging standards, as one commentator observes, “It is unclear whether these charg-
ing Standards purport to establish ethical guidelines for prosecution, or merely guide-
lines for a prosecutor’s exercise of judgment and policy in the charging function.”  
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging 
Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1261 (2011). 
 23. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-3.8(a); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) 
(2013). 
 24. Trachtenberg, supra note 1, at 1104 (“Model Rule 3.8 provides a category of 
cases in which allowing grand jury deliberations would not only be bad policy but 
would also risk violating the ethical rules of the legal profession.”). 
 25. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-3.8(a). 
 26. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993); Trachtenberg, supra note 1, at 1104. 
 27. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9. 
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grand jury case, the only way he could do any of those things is by signing an 
indictment previously approved by the grand jury, and then, per Missouri 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23.01(a), filing it with the court.28  He did nei-
ther.29 
Note that both the binding Missouri ethics rule and the precatory ABA 
standard are violated only if a prosecutor “knows” that a proposed charge is 
“not supported by probable cause.”30  The evidence that Mr. McCulloch 
“knew” that no possible homicide charge against Officer Wilson was “sup-
ported by probable cause” is ephemeral, at best.  Professor Trachtenberg’s 
only proof of Mr. McCulloch’s state of mind comes from an exchange be-
tween himself and Mr. McCulloch at a presentation at the University of Mis-
souri School of Law in March 2015.  Professor Trachtenberg asked Mr. 
McCulloch, “Do you believe that it would have been in the public interest for 
Darren Wilson to have been indicted?”31  To which McCulloch responded: 
No, I don’t think it would have been right based on all the evidence, as 
we know it now or we knew it by the end of the grand jury presenta-
tion.  It would not have been right . . . for them to have returned a true 
bill on that, or for us to have filed a charge.32 
Observe four points about this exchange.  First, Mr. McCulloch was 
asked about his considered views in March 2015, not about what he was 
 
 28. See MO. R. CRIM. P. 23.01(a). 
 29. There is now a fourth edition of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, 
and the text of analogous section of the new edition appears below. 
 
Standard 3-4.3 Minimum Requirements for Filing and Maintaining Criminal 
Charges 
(a) A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor 
reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that ad-
missible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice. 
(b) After criminal charges are filed, a prosecutor should maintain them only if 
the prosecutor continues to reasonably believe that probable cause exists and 
that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
Standard 3-4.3 (4th ed. 2015).  It also refers to seeking or filing “criminal charges” 
and thus does not change the gravamen of the former rule or the argument here.  See 
id. 
 30. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-3.8(a); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) 
(2013). 
 31. Robert McCulloch, Prosecuting Att’y St. Louis Cty., Address at the Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QBP_7UTjy4A (the relevant question and answer occurs from 1:01:30–
1:05:34). 
 32. Trachtenberg, supra note 1, at 1105 (quoting McCulloch, supra note 31). 
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thinking back in November 2014 when the grand jury concluded its delibera-
tions.  Second, Mr. McCulloch was quite conscious of the differing roles of 
grand jury and prosecutor, distinguishing between the grand jury’s act of 
returning a true bill, and the prosecutor’s subsequent responsibility to decide 
whether to file a charge.  Third, Mr. McCulloch was not asked, and did not 
give, his opinion about probable cause.  Fourth, what McCulloch was asked 
was whether an indictment “would have been in the public interest.”33    
Prosecutors quite often – and quite properly – decide that the public in-
terest dictates not pursuing charges as to which there may be probable cause.  
There are a host of legitimate reasons for declining to file such cases.34  One 
of key importance in the Brown-Wilson shooting is that, while a prosecutor 
can, ethically, file charges supported by mere probable cause, he may not, 
ethically, pursue a case to trial unless he is in possession of admissible evi-
dence amounting to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  That is the point of the 
second half of ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function 
Standard 3.9(a) quoted by Professor Trachtenberg: “A prosecutor should not 
institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal 
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a convic-
tion.”35 
Thus, in a situation like this one, where the factual investigation was ex-
haustive and effectively complete at the time the charging decision was called 
for, even if a grand jury finds probable cause to believe that an offense has 
occurred, a prosecutor ought not to “institute” charges by signing and filing 
the indictment absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  So far as can be de-
 
 33. McCulloch, supra note 31. 
 34. Prosecutors may properly decline to file cases where the evidence establishes 
probable cause but not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, where the case is of a type 
better handled by another jurisdiction, where the case is not among the subject matter 
priorities of the prosecutor’s office, where the severity of the case falls below a decli-
nation threshold set by the office, where some of the evidence has been procured by 
police misconduct, and for many other reasons.  See generally, ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.4 (4th ed. 
2015) (listing appropriate considerations for filing decisions). 
 35. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993).  The Third Edition of ABA’s Prosecution 
Function Standard 3-3.9(f), the one quoted by Professor Trachtenberg, is poorly draft-
ed and muddies the distinction between the standard for filing a case and the standard 
for pursuing it to a criminal conviction.  See id.  Given the time constraints imposed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court on filing decisions, particularly where a defendant is in 
custody, prosecutors must often file charges before a complete investigation is possi-
ble.  Such charges may properly be filed, and will be reviewed by a court, based on 
the existence of probable cause.  Nonetheless, if the complete investigation fails to 
produce evidence sufficient to establish guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the prose-
cutor should not pursue the case to trial, and should dismiss the action.  This distinc-
tion is given more recognition in the current Fourth Edition of the ABA’s Prosecution 
Function Standard.  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.3 (4th ed. 2015). 
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termined from the Trachtenberg-McCulloch exchange, at the close of the 
grand jury investigation Mr. McCulloch might have believed either: (a) that 
no probable cause existed that Officer Wilson committed a homicide, or (b) 
that the evidence established probable cause, but did not, and never would, 
amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.36  If McCulloch held either view, 
he acted entirely in accord with Standard 3.9(a) since he never instituted, or 
caused to be instituted, a criminal charge. 
Moreover, the Trachtenberg-McCulloch exchange admits a third inter-
pretation.  It may well be that – whatever Mr. McCulloch’s off-the-cuff retro-
spective assessment in March 2015 – back in November 2014, at the close of 
the grand jury presentation, he remained uncertain about the strength of the 
case against Officer Wilson  (or thought the case weak but wanted confirma-
tion of that impression from outside the law enforcement community) and 
sought an evaluation by a neutral cross-section of the community – the grand 
jury.  In seeking the grand jury’s view, Mr. McCulloch acted in accordance 
both with venerable understandings of a grand jury’s proper function and 
with the most recent version of the ABA’s prosecution standards. 
As the leading treatise on American criminal procedure observes:  
[G]rand jury participation [in an investigation] often helps in main-
taining community confidence in the integrity of the investigatory 
process, a particularly valuable asset when the person under investiga-
tion is a public official.  The community tends to be suspicious of par-
tisan influences in such investigations, especially where the investiga-
tion results in a decision not to prosecute.37 
Standard 4.6(b) of the current edition of the ABA Standards opines: “In 
addition to determining what criminal charges to file, a grand jury may 
properly be used to investigate potential criminal conduct, and also to deter-
mine the sense of the community regarding potential charges.”38  If Mr. 
McCulloch was wise, he would have wanted the grand jury’s opinion in the 
Brown-Wilson case, particularly since it concerned a matter where the work-
ing relationship of prosecutors with police officers might distort his own 
judgment, or at least be seen to have done so.  Even if Mr. McCulloch was 
not wise, and was not acting for this reason, we as a community should want 
prosecutors to do as McCulloch did.  By permitting the grand jurors to delib-
 
 36. See McCulloch, supra note 31. 
 37. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.3(g) (4th ed. 2015).  
The authors go on to observe: “As one court noted, ‘Where corruption is charged, it is 
desirable to have someone outside the administration [i.e., the grand jury] act, so that 
the image, as well as the fact of impartiality in the investigation can be preserved and 
allegations of cover-up or white-wash can be avoided.’”  Id.  Although the Brown-
Wilson case is not, strictly speaking, one involving “corruption,” the point is, if any-
thing, more valid. 
 38. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.6 (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis added). 
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erate without recommending any particular verdict, the prosecutor gave lay 
representatives of the community a voice, and, critically, did so without try-
ing to predetermine the outcome. 
IV.  THE VOICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
There is one point on which Professor Trachtenberg stands on firmer 
ground.  Both the ABA Prosecution Function Standards and the National 
District Attorneys Association’s (“NDAA”) National Prosecution Standards 
advise that a prosecutor should “recommend that a grand jury not indict if the 
prosecutor believes that the evidence presented does not warrant an indict-
ment under governing law.”39  If we assume that Mr. McCulloch firmly be-
lieved, before the grand jury’s deliberations, that the evidence did not warrant 
an indictment, these standards suggest that he should have told the grand jury 
his views  (even though no statute or binding disciplinary rule required that 
he do so). 
But there is a reason the ABA and NDAA provisions are “standards,” 
not statutes.  They provide guidance for typical cases, and for typical cases 
their objectives are both laudable and reasonably plain.  However, if adher-
ence to the letter of these standards would not promote their objectives, or 
indeed might have the reverse effect, blind adherence is neither required nor 
meritorious. 
The point of this particular rule is to protect the subjects of meritless 
grand jury investigations from the personal, professional, and reputational 
injuries that inevitably flow from the mere fact of an indictment, even if the 
case is ultimately dismissed.  If a prosecutor recommends against indictment, 
a grand jury is less likely to return one.  Of course, in an ordinary case where 
the existence of a grand jury investigation is either secret or of no interest to 
anyone beyond those immediately involved in the case, the target’s interests 
are entirely satisfied if no indictment is returned by the grand jury or filed 
with the court.  So long as no charge results, whether the prosecutor was ac-
tive or passive is of no consequence to the target and of no interest to the 
public.  Nonetheless, the ABA and NDAA standards recognize that a prose-
cutor’s views will generally be influential with the grand jury, and thus they 
counsel prosecutors to exercise their influence to reduce the likelihood of 
meritless indictments. 
However, there are cases – and the Brown-Wilson shooting is emphati-
cally one of them – in which neither the interests of the grand jury target nor 
the public interest is served by the prosecutor providing an opinion about the 
 
 39. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 4-8.1(d) (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys 
Ass’n, 3d ed. 2012), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w
%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf.  ABA Prosecution Function Standards have nearly 
identical wording.  Standard 4.6(a) states: “A prosecutor should advise a grand jury of 
the prosecutor’s opinion that it should not indict if the prosecutor believes the evi-
dence presented does not warrant an indictment.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.6. 
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merits of prospective charges to a grand jury.  Let us assume, as does Profes-
sor Trachtenberg, that Mr. McCulloch had made up his mind before the grand 
jury’s deliberations that no probable cause existed to charge Officer Wilson.  
In the Ferguson maelstrom, McCulloch’s silence on that point before the 
grand jury created no risk that Wilson would suffer an additional increment 
of professional, personal, or reputational injury of the type an ordinarily 
anonymous defendant might incur from the return of an indictment.  After all, 
by November 2014, Officer Wilson’s name and face, many details of the 
shooting, and the pendency of a grand jury investigation were common cur-
rency around the planet.  And if, as Professor Trachtenberg supposes, Mr. 
McCulloch was firmly of the view that no probable cause existed and re-
solved not to prosecute Wilson, then McCulloch’s silence before the grand 
jury did not even create a heightened risk that Wilson would be formally 
charged.  Either the grand jury would decline to indict or, in the unlikely 
event it returned a true bill, Mr. McCulloch would decline to sign and file it.40 
Far from injuring Officer Wilson, Mr. McCulloch’s silence before the 
grand jury ultimately provided him some benefit.  A verdict of “no true bill” 
issued in accordance with the recommendation of a Prosecuting Attorney 
widely accused of being too sympathetic to police officers would have been 
worth less to Officer Wilson than the same verdict by a grand jury that 
reached its conclusions independently.41  Moreover, and frankly more im-
portantly, in the unusual circumstances of the Brown-Wilson case, the public 
interest in a grand jury decision that was not only impartial, but perceived to 
be so, was of paramount concern. 
In this regard, it is significant that, in the on-campus exchange with Mr. 
McCulloch that inspired his article, Professor Trachtenberg asked about 
McCulloch’s view of the “public interest.”42  I would suggest that Mr. 
McCulloch’s procedural course is best explained with precisely that frame of 
reference.  Assume that, at the close of the evidentiary presentation to the 
grand jury, McCulloch had indeed concluded that no probable cause existed.  
He had four choices: (1) present the grand jury with proposed charges and 
legal instructions and recommend that the grand jury indict on charges he did 
not believe to be supported by probable cause; (2) withdraw the matter from 
 
 40. Of course, if McCulloch really was resolved not to prosecute Officer Wilson, 
return of a true bill would truly have put him in a cleft stick, forcing him to decide 
whether to take responsibility for overruling the grand jury’s opinion or to take what 
he presumably thought an unwinnable case to trial.  But the grand jury did not return 
an indictment, so we will never know what he might have done. 
 41. Some have argued that Mr. McCulloch’s office swayed the grand jury toward 
Officer Wilson in the way it presented evidence.  See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, St. Louis 
Prosecutor Bob McCulloch Abused the Grand Jury Process, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 
25, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120422/bob-mcculloch-abused-grand-jury-
process-ferguson.  I express no opinion here on that point, but it is irrelevant to the 
question of whether Mr. McCulloch’s decision not to make a recommendation to the 
grand jury on charging did or did not benefit Officer Wilson. 
 42. McCulloch, supra note 31. 
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the grand jury’s consideration and bar them from deliberating on the ground 
that he believed no probable cause existed;43 (3) present them with proposed 
charges and legal instructions, but advise them that he did not believe the 
facts supported any charge; or (4) present them with proposed charges and 
legal instructions and render no opinion on what they should do. 
The first option would have been a gross ethical violation.44  The second 
would have guaranteed a riot and immediate charges of a prosecutorial 
whitewash.  The third would probably have produced a riot, together with 
allegations of prosecutorial manipulation of the grand jury.  Only the fourth 
choice, the one McCulloch made, held out a reasonable prospect that the pub-
lic would accept a decision not to file as the product of neutral, unbiased citi-
zen deliberation based on a complete record.  As it turned out, a riot happened 
anyway.  And Mr. McCulloch was accused of manipulating the grand jury 
anyway.  But given the visceral emotional commitment of one segment of the 
public to the view that Wilson had murdered Brown, nothing but an indict-
ment would have averted all disturbances.  Faced with an array of suboptimal 
choices, the process McCulloch employed maximized the credibility of the 
grand jury’s verdict among those members of the public who retained open 
minds on the merits of the case. 
Professor Trachtenberg ridicules Mr. McCulloch for permitting the 
grand jury to deliberate at all, characterizing it as “hiding behind the anony-
mous lay persons on the grand jury,” and “choosing . . . to delegate his re-
sponsibilities to untrained citizens with inadequate guidance.”45  This seems 
to me a curious view of the grand jury as an institution and of grand jurors as 
persons.  The role of a grand jury, after all, is not merely to provide an audi-
ence for the testimony of the witnesses their subpoena authority empowers 
the prosecutor to summon.  In the end, theirs is the grave responsibility of 
considering what they have heard and rendering a judgment representative of 
a cross-section of the community about whether the evidence is sufficient to 
put a fellow citizen on trial and in peril of loss of freedom, reputation, or even 
life.  The law takes the grand jury’s performance of this screening function 
 
 43. Strictly speaking, a prosecutor could not prohibit a grand jury from deliberat-
ing or returning an indictment if it wanted to do so.  A grand jury can do both those 
things without the prosecutor’s permission.  Of course, the grand jurors customarily 
do not know that, and as noted above, even if a “runaway” grand jury were to return 
an unsolicited indictment, it could not be legally filed without the prosecutor’s assent 
in the form of a signature.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). 
 44. Advising a grand jury to find probable cause when a prosecutor did not be-
lieve it to exist would violate an attorney’s general obligation of candor with a tribu-
nal.  MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-3.3(a)(1), (d).  It would also violate Standard 4.3(a), which 
states, “A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor rea-
sonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause . . . .”  ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 
3-4.3 (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis added).  However, the ABA’s Prosecution Standards 
are merely advisory. 
 45. Trachtenberg, supra note 1, at 1100. 
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very seriously.  For example, in Missouri, if an indictment is filed, the grand 
jury’s return of a true bill is deemed conclusive on the question of whether 
probable cause exists, and thus a defendant is entitled to no judicial review of 
probable cause in a preliminary hearing.46 
Whenever one speaks of the importance of the screening function of 
grand juries, there is apt to be a good deal of world-weary head shaking and 
amused tittering about how grand juries will indict items of luncheon food if 
asked by the prosecutor.  Implicit in such talk, and indeed in Professor 
Trachtenberg’s characterization of grand jurors as “anonymous lay persons” 
and “untrained citizens with inadequate guidance,” is an image of grand juries 
as crowds of credulous yokels too dim to form independent judgments or too 
weak-willed to express them.  No prosecutor who has practiced with any fre-
quency before grand juries entertains any such disparaging view. 
Grand juries, in my fairly extensive experience with them,47 take their 
responsibility of standing between government and individuals very serious-
ly.48  They are, as a nearly invariable rule, attentive, perceptive, and bright.  
They listen carefully to legal instructions, but precisely because they are not 
legally trained, they see things that lawyers sometimes do not.  They some-
times do decline to indict in cases where the prosecutor would like them to do 
so.  Particularly in a long investigation, their reactions to the developing case 
can have a profound effect on the prosecutor’s views.49  And, in the end, their 
 
 46. State v. Blackmon, 664 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“A defend-
ant’s substantive rights are not affected by a preliminary hearing.  In fact, such a hear-
ing is not even a part of the constitutional right to due process.”); State v. Day, 506 
S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
(1970)) (“But Coleman v. Alabama does not hold that an accused is entitled to a pre-
liminary hearing as a matter of constitutional right, and in fact, he is not.”). 
 47. I have practiced as a Trial Attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice before 
federal grand juries in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of 
Kentucky, as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney before grand juries in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney before grand juries in the 
Southern District of Florida.  I also have some experience with state grand juries in 
Colorado. 
 48. It is certainly true that grand juries almost always return indictments when 
asked to do so by prosecutors.  But that is hardly surprising.  The standard of proof 
for a true bill is mere probable cause.  Prosecutors are ethically bound not to present 
cases unless they are convinced probable cause exists.  And both ethics and common 
sense dictate that cases not be brought before grand juries unless the prosecutor be-
lieves proof beyond a reasonable doubt exists or can reasonably be anticipated before 
the matter goes to trial.  If grand juries were finding no true bills in cases recom-
mended for indictment by the government with any frequency, that would suggest a 
shocking dereliction of duty by prosecutors. 
 49. One might fairly ask how a prosecutor can know what grand jurors are think-
ing before they are asked to vote on an indictment.  Certainly no official interim poll 
is taken, and there should not be any informal off-the-record discussion between 
prosecutors and grand jurors about a pending case.  Nonetheless, grand jurors often 
ask questions of prosecutors on the record as the investigation progresses, sometimes 
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collective view, expressed in the final vote on proposed charges, is as good a 
reading as a government lawyer can get of the voice of the people.  Accord-
ingly, every prosecutor with an ounce of sense does precisely what the ABA 
suggests and, particularly in difficult cases, relies on them “to determine the 
sense of the community regarding potential charges.”50 
That said, Professor Trachtenberg’s charge that Mr. McCulloch was 
“hiding” behind the decision of the grand jury might have some force if 
McCulloch had simply announced the return of a no true bill and maintained 
the customary secrecy of grand jury proceedings.  Missouri statutes preclude 
the issuance of grand jury reports51 and bar grand jurors from disclosing “any 
evidence given before the grand jury” or the names of witnesses who testi-
fied, on pain of prosecution.52  It appears that the custom of Missouri prose-
cutors before the Brown-Wilson case was to treat the specific prohibition of 
juror disclosure as a general bar to disclosure of grand jury matters by any-
one, absent a court order, except in the context of pre-trial discovery in cases 
where an indictment resulted.  Had Mr. McCulloch adhered to that norm, the 
public really would have been obliged to rely on the unexplained conclusions 
of twelve anonymous strangers and blind faith that Mr. McCulloch’s prosecu-
tors had not led the jury astray. 
Instead, Mr. McCulloch did something quite extraordinary.  Rather than 
obtaining a court order for release of the grand jury materials,53 he announced 
a novel interpretation of provisions of the state Sunshine Act that require the 
release to the public of investigative records once an investigation becomes 
inactive.  He declared that copies of grand jury materials in the Prosecuting 
Attorney’s files were investigative records, and thus once the grand jury de-
 
about the law, sometimes about the status of the investigation, sometimes about 
whether certain witnesses will appear or specific evidence will be produced.  Moreo-
ver, grand jurors are often permitted to ask questions of witnesses.  A good deal can 
be gleaned from all these questions. 
 50. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.6 (4th ed. 2015). 
 51. Missouri grand juries have no authority to issue a written report of their in-
vestigations other than those pertaining to public buildings.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
540.031 (Cum. Supp. 2013); In re Interim Report of the Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d 479, 
481 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). 
 52. MO. REV. STAT. § 540.320 (2000). 
 53. Mr. McCulloch’s office initially sought a court order releasing the grand jury 
records in the event of a declination to indict.  Joel Currier, Court: Judge Hasn’t 
Agreed to Release Ferguson Grand Jury Evidence If No Indictment, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Nov. 23, 2014, 11:10 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
and-courts/court-judge-hasn-t-agreed-to-release-ferguson-grand-
jury/article_d7774a87-205e-55e5-9138-7817d6bfd82c.html.  However, his office 
later abandoned that motion in favor of releasing the information under the Missouri 
Sunshine Act.  Heather Cole et al., ‘Data Dump’ After Ferguson May Be Hard Act to 
Follow, MO. LAW. WKLY. (Nov. 28, 2014), http://molawyersmedia.com/2014/
11/28/data-dump-after-ferguson-may-be-tough-act-to-follow/. 
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clined to indict, they were subject to public disclosure.54  Whether Mr. 
McCulloch’s reading of the Sunshine Act is correct may well be doubted.  
What cannot be doubted is that he strained the law nearly to the breaking 
point to lay the whole grand jury record – all the testimony, all the exhibits, 
all the legal advice – before the world.55  Far from “hiding” behind the grand 
jury, Mr. McCulloch gave anyone who cared to do so an unprecedented op-
portunity to evaluate both the facts of the case and the prosecution’s conduct. 
It is, of course, true that for Mr. McCulloch (or any other prosecutor) 
faced with the ticklish task of investigating a high-profile, potentially incen-
diary, case, there is a considerable advantage to be gleaned from having the 
final decision about whether or not to bring charges bear the imprimatur of a 
grand jury.  The grand jury’s verdict confers a democratic stamp of approval 
on a choice that, if it issued from the prosecutor alone, is more easily attacked 
as biased or self-serving.  And abstaining from a recommendation to the 
grand jury further reinforces the message of grand jury independence.  This is 
a “political” advantage, if one wants to call it that.  But being a public prose-
cutor is, unavoidably and quite properly, a political business.  It is political in 
the personal sense inasmuch as elected prosecutors will inevitably keep at 
least one eye on the effects of their legal decisions on their electoral fortunes.  
But the prosecutor’s job is also “political” in the larger sense that a criminal 
justice system in a democratic polity cannot function if the public sees it as 
merely a collection of rules enforced by the state’s monopoly on official co-
ercion.  A democratic criminal justice system depends on its legitimacy.  It 
must not only produce outcomes that are “correct” in some narrow legal 
sense, but must employ processes the public perceives to be fair. 
I do not doubt that Mr. McCulloch was fully aware that a “no true bill” 
rendered without a recommendation from his office provided enhanced insu-
lation from claims of unseemly prosecutorial protectiveness of the police.  
But strange though it may seem in these cynical days, merely because some-
thing is politically wise does not make it ethically wrong.  Mr. McCulloch 
was handed the one kind of case every prosecutor most dreads: factually 
complicated, legally debatable, universally publicized and – because whatev-
er choice you make will enrage a large and vocal constituency – potentially 
lethal both to your own career and the long-term credibility of the institutions 
you represent.  That he dealt with it by adopting a process far more thorough, 
open, and neutral than is customary seems to me a sign, not of political cow-
ardice, but of considerable sagacity – in the service of his personal interests, 
to be sure, but also of the justice system more broadly. 
 
 54. Cole et al., supra note 53.  See also Joseph E. Martineau et al., Grand Jury 
Records – Can the Public Get Them?, LEWIS RICE (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.lewis
rice.com/publications/grand-jury-records-can-the-public-get-them-2/. 
 55. Joe Millitzer et al., Prosecutor Robert McCulloch Releases Grand Jury Evi-
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Nothing I have said here will rehabilitate Robert McCulloch in the eyes 
of those who believe Officer Darren Wilson murdered Michael Brown, and 
that Mr. McCulloch, whether because of bigotry, pro-police bias, cynical 
political calculation, or simple professional misjudgment, refused to prose-
cute a meritorious case.  This Article takes no position on the legal question 
of whether probable cause existed to charge Officer Wilson with a crime, or 
on the question of whether such a charge, if filed, could have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a St. Louis County jury.  Opinion on those 
questions is likely to remain intractably divided.  I have nothing to say about 
them here.  My sole point is that Professor Trachtenberg’s particular criti-
cisms of Mr. McCulloch are misconceived. 
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